18 February 1945

       0500 Changed course to 048 (t). 0410 Changed course to 010 (t). 0435 Changed course to 340 (t). 0600 Commenced zig-zagging. 0827 Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course. 0835 Changed course to 351 (t). Commenced zigzagging,. 0906 Possible submarine contact, commenced emergency maneuvers. 0939 Increased speed to 14 knots. 1001 Contact evaluated as non-sub, resumed zigzagging 1515 Commenced approach to Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, in accordance with ComPhibsPac's Operation Order A25-44. 1622 Ceased zigzagging, resumed base course. 1635 Changed course to 006 (t). 1641 Commenced zigzagging. 2100 Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course. Position: 0800 20° 28' N 142° 38' E

19         February 1945 (D-day)

0031 Changed course to 330 (t) .' 0245 Ships left to course 320 (t) . 0335 Ships right to Course 330 (t). 0408 Changed course to 285 {t). 0457 Increased speed to 14.5 knots. 0604 Formed cruising disposition DOG Form ONE. 0612 Changed course to 325 (t). 0622 Changed course to 315 (t). 0637 Arrived in transport area of Southeast coast of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands. Task Group designation changed to 53.2. ComTaskGroup 53.2, Commodore H. C. FLANAGAN in USS BAYFIELD. Commenced lowering boats and debarking troops. At HOW-Hour minus 25 {HOW-Hour 0900), six waves consisting of Reserves of the 23rd RCT, 4th Marines, were dispatched to the line of departure. 1157 Received aboard the first group of casualties from the beach. 1555 LSM 48 came alongside to receive cargo. 1720 LSM away from alongside, hoist all boats aboard. 1836 Underway with Task Group 53.2 on night retirement to the east to arrive in the transport area the following morning.

20-28 February 1945

The Beach Party of this ship was landed on BLUE Beach ONE on the morning of DOG day plus one for services on YELLOW Beach TWO. Upon arrival relieved the Beach Party of the USS MIFFLIN. The Beach Party remained on YELLOW Beach TWO for a period of four days and nights attending and evacuating casualties, salvaging broached boats and attempting to clear the beach for the landing of boats. Due to the surf conditions and nature of the terrain, little progress could be effected in clearing the beach for use by landing boats. The beach at the water's edge was almost completely blocked with bogged down amphibious tanks, LVT's, vehicles, and broached boats. By the fourth day clearing had been effected to permit a slow flow of cargo to be landed. The entire four days on the beach were spent under enemy mortar and artillery fire, resulting in 1/3 (16) of the beach party becoming casualties (13 wounded, 2 dead, 1 missing).

During the operation twenty-two LCVP's, two LCM's. one LCP(R) equipped as a salvage boat, and one LCP (L) equipped as boat group commander and control boat, were used. Ship's boats which were loaded with cargo were not allowed to land. This was high priority cargo and cargo called for from the beach as being urgently needed. Some of the boats were in the water with a load of urgently needed cargo for four days before finally being permitted to land.

During this time they returned to the ship each morning for fuel and a change of crew and went immediately back to the beach. Three LCT's and one LSM were employed at various times after DOG plus four in unloading general cargo. In this connection, it is recommended that a sufficient number of LCT's and LSM's be provided to unload all cargo. Twelve LCVP's were launched from Welin davits, all other boats were lowered by cargo booms. As much cargo as possible was preloaded. All davit boats were loaded at the rail, main deck, with debarking troops. All boat engines were Gray marine and operated without failure. The LCM(3) ramp winches failed frequently, necessitating time out for repairs. Eight LCVP's were lost, one due to gun fire, three were flooded and sunk at the beach and four broached.

Of the seven beaches, the right flank marker of RED Beach TWO was the only beach limit marker visible for ten days. This caused unnecessary confusion among boat coxswains, and resulted in some cargo being landed on the wrong beaches. BLUE Beach ONE had cargo unloading point markers until DOG plus nine.

Preparation for handling casualties consisted of the following {1 ) A reception center was set up in the troop officer's berthing compartment with facilities for cleansing and minor surgery. (2) The wardroom was used as a cleansing and shock treatment center. (3) The main sick bay was used for maj or surgery and major dressings where anesthetics were required. The majority of bed patients were cared for in the troop officer's berthing compartment, the more serious cases in sick bay, and the ambulatory in the forward troop berthing compartment on the main and third decks. Casualties were brought aboard one at a time by a six foot boom rigged amidships main deck. This method proved highly satisfactory both from a standpoint of speed and of causing least discomfort to casualties. Of the 365 casualties treated, 6 died, 27 were transferred to hospital ships, and 12 were returned to duty. The remainder were transferred to US Naval Hospital No. 111 at Guam.

With the exception of two nights spent at the objective, the LOWNDES took part in night retirement to the east, returning to the transport area each morning. At about 2130 on the night of 27 February 1945, while anchored near the beach to unload cargo, about eight bursts of mortar fire from the island fell about 25% off the starboard bow at about 600 yards distant, but the ship was not hit.

29 February 1945

1846 In accordance with orders received from ComTaskForce 51 , the USS LOWNDES with Task Unit 51.16.10 departed Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, for Saipan, Marianas Islands, on base course 204 (t}, steaming at standard speed 12 knots. ComTaskUnit 51 .1,6.10 (Commodore MC GOVERN) in USS CECIL. 2141 Changed course to 174 (t). 2201 Changed speed to 13 knots.